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Abstract
Empirical legal studies (ELS) is a sibling discipline to law and economics. Con-
ceived by a visionary scholar almost 40  years ago, it has today become a reality. 
ELS is currently one of the most interesting phenomena in legal academia. We here 
celebrate its founder Theodore Eisenberg, and provide a glimpse of this important 
step forward in modern legal scholarship, for a law and economics audience.
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1 Introduction
There are different kinds of revolutions. Some are noisy, bloody and conflictual. 
Others are silent, bloodless and underground–until they emerge and show that 
change is unavoidable. The latter type of revolution is less visible but not for this 
less disruptive, since it has the power to gradually change things until a point of no 
return is reached.
One such revolution was engendered in the mind of a visionary scholar and 
within the circle of his department colleagues. It matured over a couple of decades, 
and began to manifest itself at the start of the new millennium. In the twenty years 
since then it has continued to spread, to become today one of the major innovations 
in current legal scholarship and its surrounding fields.
We are talking about empirical legal studies (ELS), a label that sounds almost like 
an oxymoron, but which is actually the disruption that has shaken legal academia to 
its roots in the last two decades. This merit is doubly deserving of applause if we 
consider that the legal community has for a long time, as a number of commentators 
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note, “been remarkably successful in insulating itself against any infiltration of sci-
entific knowledge” (Loevinger 1949, p. 475).
ELS brought about that change. It was disseminated by a handful of scholars at 
Cornell Law School led by Theodore Eisenberg, a totemic figure among US legal 
researchers. “Ted”, as he was known to friends and colleagues, was a kind of quiet 
revolutionary who through hard work and great enthusiasm started the cross-con-
tamination of legal studies and statistics, and made Cornell Law School the birth-
place of the silent ELS revolution.
Prof. Eisenberg worked there for 33 years, teaching many courses in legal schol-
arship. He was also a prolific scholar who soon introduced into his writings the 
use of statistical methods to disentangle complex legal issues such as bankruptcy, 
damages, and juries. He was, in the words of the Dean Prof. Stewart J. Schwab, “a 
giant in the legal academia”, who not only conceived the ELS approach but also 
promoted it around the world. Indeed, while Cornell Law School and the US legal 
community can be regarded as the ‘cradle’ of ELS, it was Ted who untiringly spread 
the approach everywhere as “a superstar on the world stage” (Clermont 2014, p. 
1), thanks to his intensive travel and teaching in many countries. In particular, he 
visited Europe several times and there engaged in a number of promotional activi-
ties, including giving courses on ELS. As a result, a great many scholars were able 
to directly learn from him and put his lessons into practice, while many others were 
indirectly exposed to ELS through various types of meetings. We as individual 
scholars, and the PhD programs that we chair, were among those lucky enough to 
have shared his friendship and scholarship to the point of being “infected” by his 
enthusiasm for statistics, and were thus directly attracted to ELS.1
This journal issue springs from a workshop on empirical legal studies held on 
the occasion of the XIIth conference of the Italian Society of Law and Econom-
ics and organized by the International IEL program in Torino. It was prepared in 
memory of Ted Eisenberg, simply to show once more how his scholarship spread 
across national boundaries, to create a worldwide group of people who, in one way 
or another, have taken his lesson on board.
Even this journal, which as its title indicates is chiefly devoted to law and eco-
nomics, has been somewhat influenced by Ted’s scholarship as an author and as a 
mentor for a generation of researchers.2 Today, a large part of what is published 
1 Ted Eisenberg was on board of the IEL International PhD Program in Torino for more than 8 years and 
he regularly taught there a class on ELS and supervised a number of PhD candidates. He also actively 
contributed in fostering research and local conferences such as the project on judicial efficiency started 
that lead to a first set of articles (see Ramello and Voigt 2012) and then triggered a substantial set of 
research partially ongoing. For a glimpse of the first wave of studies on the topic somehow connected to 
this research see Voigt (2016).
2 Although Ted launched his own journal in 2004, he widely contributed with empirical studies to the 
law and economics community and specifically to this journal. In 2004 the European Journal of Law and 
Economics published an empirical study on bankruptcy in Finland by Ted Eisenberg himself (Bergstrom 
et al. 2004) and, though the journal has always been open and sensitive to statistical approaches, he influ-
enced the greater emphasis endorsed by the editors in the new aims and scope (https ://www.sprin ger.
com/journ al/10657 ).
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in the journal is empirical, and even some of the topics covered, first and foremost 
among them litigation, are ones that he investigated.
Therefore, although this issue is specifically devoted to honoring Ted’s legacy, 
many of the articles submitted and published in other issues likewise testify to the 
importance of the ELS revolution, and its impact not just in the place that was its 
cradle but all around the world.
2  ELS in a nutshell
Although law and economics has a robust empirical tradition, it is important to point 
out the novelty that ELS represents in this respect. Traditionally, law and econom-
ics scholars follow the econometric habit of starting from theoretical modeling as a 
basis for empirical investigation. The idea in general is to build up a model and then 
to test it empirically.
The novelty of the ELS approach, as Ted conceived it, is to start from data. He 
was in fact saying, “I like to let the data tell their own story, not try to superimpose 
one. As in any good scholarship, you check your assumptions. If you don’t have the 
real facts, people will make them up or follow the headlines.” (Brandt Myers 2008, 
p. 10).
An additional unavoidable tenet of ELS research is to be free from any bias or 
political agenda. According to Ted, facts are in general more interesting than any 
assumption and, when indisputable, they have the ability to shed light on societal 
problems and to accordingly inspire the need for changes (Brandt Myers 2008).
In this respect, although at the end of the day “accurate description of the legal 
system’s operation can in turn influence the outcome of specific cases [… and] can 
supply the information for sound policymaking”, according to Ted Eisenberg the 
primary goal of ELS was helping to understand “how legal system operates” (Eisen-
berg 2000, p. 665). When speaking about the use of statistics in law, he used to make 
the distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ scientific empirical analysis, and empirical 
legal studies. ‘Hard’ scientific empirical analysis is used for the sole purpose of pro-
viding evidence in common and civil law cases, such as scientific evidence used 
for forensic identification, or for establishing damages in price-fixing cases. ‘Soft’ 
scientific empirical analysis uses social statistics to analyze human behavior in legal 
disputes, such as studies aimed at demonstrating in an appeal that race or other 
determinants have affected a sentence delivered by a lower court. By contrast, in the 
empirical analysis of legal systems (ELS) scholars are unconstrained by the need to 
serve the afore-mentioned purposes. Instead, they can use the broad and inexpensive 
law-related resources available for “providing an accurate portrayal on how legal 
system operates” (Eisenberg 2000, p. 667), with the aim of promoting progress on 
wider policy questions, especially tackling enduring misperceptions.
Eisenberg began advancing his project along these lines in the early eighties, 
undertaking research, with the help of his students, on the number of civil rights 
cases in order to challenge (successfully) the common view that those cases were 
clogging the courts. The outcome was an article in the Cornell Law Review in 
which he proposed an empirically “accurate picture in order to definitively defeat 
4 European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 49:1–6
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false impressions” (Eisenberg 1982, p. 482) characterizing at that time the applica-
tion of Section 1983 of the U.S. Code and leading to the wrong impression that this 
was overwhelming federal courts.
Since then Ted never stopped doing empirical legal work any time he could get a 
hold of good data, showing that a look at the real world and the truth of figures are 
fundamental also for legal reasoning.
Indeed, Ted showed several times how preconceptions and wrong information 
might lead citizens and policymakers to pursue misguided policies on the basis of 
wrong premises.
In other words, he was able to accomplish the prescient intuition of Justice Hol-
mes who, at the end of the 19th century asserted that “For the rational study of the 
law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future 
is the man of statistics and the master of economics” (Holmes 1987, p. 469). Law 
and Economics, through the work of its pioneers Guido Calabresi, Ronald Coase, 
Henry Manne and Richard Posner, made the second part of this intuition a reality; 
and Eisenberg, despite the mild reception afforded to Jurimetrics in the mid-1950s, 
fostered the next step forward of legal studies towards empirics, and finally realized 
the first part, making legal scholars “men of statistics” (Loevinger 1949).3
Thanks to Eisenberg, empirical legal research today is a reality that applies rig-
orous social science methodology to subjects that have a legal component but can 
involve areas as wide-ranging as criminal justice, corporate law, healthcare, and 
securities regulation. As a wise and forward-looking man, alongside the legacy of 
many scholars and a network of friends/colleagues, he left a number of institutions 
instrumental to supporting ELS in academic life. These are the Society for Empirical 
Legal Studies (SELS)–which organizes an annual conference (CELS), a blog, and 
finally the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies (JELS). The Journal in particular had 
been a dream of Ted’s, following the Coasean lesson of how Law and Economics 
crucially benefited from the existence of the Journal of Law and Economics to trans-
form an intuition into a well-structured scientific approach and disseminate it world-
wide (Eisenberg 2011). All these institutions are in good health and well-known to 
anyone in the community. We are thus celebrating here not just those institutions but 
also the network of colleagues, which some scholars define as the “invisible college” 
that Ted built all around the world.
3  Sketch
Despite its quiet ascent, ELS today amounts to a disruptive innovation il legal 
schoòarship–so that we can in a sense draw a distinction between the empirical 
legal literature before and after ELS. This special issue gathers together papers 
3 On the seminal role played by the founding fathers of law and economics in establishing the discipline 
see among others Marciano and Ramello (2014), Ramello (2016) and Gordon et al. (2019) on Calabresi 
and Coase, Cass and Colombatto (2018) on Manne and Marciano and Ramello (2017) on Posner in the 
pages of this journal.
51 3
European Journal of Law and Economics (2020) 49:1–6 
from the post-ELS revolution that have in one way or another been affected by its 
novel lesson and more specifically by Ted Eisenberg.
The first article, by Mark Ramseyer (in this issue), is a straightforward exam-
ple of how data can be used in order to understand the real world. The paper in 
particular clarifies why in Japanese towns with nuclear reactors there are fewer 
investments and economic activities are more scant. While a simple mispercep-
tion might ascribe to nuclear plants the responsibility for crowding-out invest-
ments in those regions, a careful analysis of the data shows that nuclear installa-
tions are attracted by towns in which social capital has already been depleted, and 
where there is already a substantial decline. Consequently, the risk associated to 
nuclear plants at worst simply exacerbates a dynamic already in progress.
The second paper, by Shay Lavie, Tal Ganor and Yuval Feldman (this issue), 
treads a similar methodological path, showing how data allows us to delve 
beneath the surface to understand the world, and advances the approach to the 
production of experimental data. The study explores whether the interpretation of 
legal standards is influenced by decision-makers’ substantive decision, that is to 
say whether, beyond any formal declaration, there is interdependence between the 
merits decision and the interpretation of the legal rule. Interestingly, they observe 
that while decision makers do not shift the interpretation of legal standards, they 
may indeed shift their perception of the evidence.
The remaining set of papers deals with what can probably be considered the 
core of Ted Eisenberg’s research, that it to say disentangling and understanding 
judicial systems and the ways in which they operate. Taken together, they provide 
a broad view spanning from the US to Taiwan.
The article by John Szmer, Robert Christensen and Samuel Grubbs (this issue) 
is devoted to understanding factors that influence the citation of judicial opinions 
written by U.S. Courts of Appeals judges. Since judges represent the core of judi-
cial technology, citation patterns may reveal a vantage point for understanding 
how judicial decision-making works. The authors discover here that, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, opinion-writer characteristics are the most influential 
class of regressors while panel-level effects are almost negligible.
The paper by Jerg Gutmann and Stefan Voigt (this issue) is aimed at solving 
an existing puzzle, namely why national levels of de facto judicial independ-
ence–independent of whether it is measured in terms of the perceptions of citi-
zens and business people or based on objective data–are in general negatively 
associated with de jure judicial independence–that is, the existence of formal 
legislation favoring judicial independence. Typically, one would expect that bet-
ter legislation is associated with better outcomes. Gutmann and Voigt rule out a 
number of possible explanations before they find that culture, measured in the 
form of either individualism or trust, might be responsible for the gap between de 
jure and de facto judicial independence in EU member states.
The paper by Peter Grajzl and Shikha Silwal (this issue) provides an empirical 
insight into the judiciary of a developing country, Nepal, and also advances the 
empirical literature on courts by using a novel measure of judicial staffing and 
suggesting a new instrumental-variable approach to tackle specific endogeneity 
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issues. Its findings, contrary to previous studies, indicate that judicial staffing 
exhibits a positive effect on court outputs.
Last but not least, the contribution by Yun-chien Chang and Su-hao Tu (this 
issue) fills a gap in empirical studies on attorney fees. Exploiting a database con-
cerning the Taiwanese judicial systems, the authors are able to investigate the incen-
tives provided by a fixed-fee scheme on attorneys and their clients. They discover 
that–despite the conventional expectation that risk-free compensation independent 
of case outcome might determine a low effort by an attorney–reputation and its 
effects on future business are canceling out this phenomenon. Rather, the low prob-
ability of winning may lead attorneys to decline representation, notwithstanding the 
secure income.
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